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ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A NONCONFISCATORY RATE AND A JUST
AND REASONABLE RATE
MAURICE

H.

MERRILL*

Among the many things read into the due process clauses of the
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments by judicial interpretation is
the rule that rates established for public utilities by governmental
authority must yield, after all legitimate charges to operating costs
are met, a surplus, alliteratively yclept reasonable return, upon what
we used to refer to as the fair value of the property and are coming
to call the rate base.' Rates which do not yield this surplus are
called confiscatory.2 Statutes vesting rate-making or rate-controlling
authority upon subordinate public agencies, on the other hand,
commonly decree as the standard for the exercise of this authority
that rates shall be "reasonable and just" or some similar verbal
combination. 3 The confiscatory rate marks the lower limit beyond
which the courts say the constitution will not permit government to
reduce charges; the reasonable rate is the standard which the legislature has prescribed for rate-making within constitutional limits.
The very understandable desire of the patrons for service at the
lowest possible cost tends toward insistence by their representatives
that the reasonable rate to be fixed by the regulatory body should
be one just avoiding the judicial ban against confiscation. 4 It is
equally natural that the utilities, insisting upon a more liberal interpretation of the term reasonable and just, should contend that it
calls for a rate fixed at a substantially higher figure.5 It is the
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
1

Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898); Bluefield W. W. & I.
Co. v. Public Service Com., 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923). See also

statements in

I WRITTEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (2d
ed. 1928) 34; GRONINGER, PUBLIC UTILITY RATE MAKING (1929) c. 7.
2
Bluefield W. W. & I. Co. v. Public Service Com., supra note I.
3

The following may be taken as typical: Ala. Civ. Code (1923) §§ 9629, 9777;
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) §§ 3635, 3636; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 49,
§§ 449, 72; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 6448; Wis. Stat. (1927) § 196.37.
See comment by Brandeis, J., in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service
Com., 262 U. S. 276, 296, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 549

(1923).

5The views in favor of this contention are set out in Guernsey, Principles
Underlying Reasonable Rates (1927) 2 ALA. L. J. 3; Guernsey, State Commission
Laws Regulate Rates, Not Profits (1927) 13 VA. L. REV. 257; Guernsey, The Test
of Reasonable Raes (1927) 14 VA. L. REV. I; Updegraff, Deductions from the
Economic Basis of Public Utility Rates (1927) 12 IowA L. REv. 249.
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purpose of this paper to examine the problem with a view to suggesting the proper solution of the dispute. In such an examination
three questions appear to be involved: (i) Maya "just and reasonable"
rate under the statutes be substantially in excess of a barely nonconfiscatory rate? (2) Must it be so? (3) Should it be so?
WHAT IS A NONCONFIScAToRY RATE?

As a preliminary step it becomes necessary to define what is
meant by a rate that is nonconfiscatory. There was an early opinion,
apparently centering around a dictum of Mr. Justice Brewer while
Circuit Judge, 6 to the effect that confiscation was present only when
the prescribed rates allowed no return whatever over operating
expenses. 7 Smyth v. Ames, 8 however, definitely decided that the
mere fact that some return is realized is not enough. There must be
a "fair return."9 In the main, decisions have been inadequate and
uninforming in their treatment of the factors which determine the
existence of such a return.'0 In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. West Virginia Public Service Com." Mr. Justice Butler
gave the following description of the return to which the utility is
constitutionally entitled:
"The company contends that the rate of return is too low
and confiscatory. What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends upon many circumstances and must be
determined by the exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment,
having regard to all relevant facts. A public utility is entitled
61"... the right of judicial interference exists only when the schedule of rates
established will fail to secure to the owners of the property some compensation or
incomefrom their investment. As to the amount of such compensation, if some
compensation or reward is in fact secured, the legislature is the sole judge."
Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 878 (C. C. Iowa, 1888) Brewer, J.
expressed the same view thirteen years later in the following dictum: "As to
parties engaged in performing a public service, while the power to regulate has
been sustained, negatively the court has held that the legislature may not prescribe rates which, if enforced, would amount to a confiscation of property. But
it has not held affirmatively that the legislature may enforce rates which stop
only this side of confiscation, and leave the property in the hands and under the
care of the owners without any remuneration for its use." Cotting v. Kansas City
S. Y. Co., 183 U. S. 79, 91, 22 Sup. Ct. 30, 35 (19O1).
7See MbcKenna, Circuit Judge, in Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Com'rs,
78 Fed. 236, 261 (C. C. Calif. 1896). Cf. Morgan's L. & T. R. R. & S. S. Co.

v. Railroad Com., 127 La. 636, 667, 53 So. 8go, 9oo (i9ii).
sSupra note i.

9Smyth v. Ames, supra note I, at 547, i8 Sup. Ct. at 434.
10A full review of the cases may be found in 2 WHITTEN, op.
§§ 872-875.
1262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923).

Cit.

supra note I,

JUST AND REASONABLE RATE

449

to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of
the property which it employs for the convenience of the public
equal to that generally being made at the same time and in
the same general part of the country on investments in other
business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties: but it has no constitutional right to
profits such as are realized or anticipated fi highly profitable
enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be
reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient
and economical management, to maintain and support its
credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper
discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reason* able at one time and become too high or too low by changes
affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and
business conditions generally."' 2
That is, the return must be sufficiently high to enable the utility to
secure additional capital, as needed, in competition with businesses
involving similar risks at the time and place.13 A subsequent decision
of the Supreme Court confirms this requirement, 14 and the lower
federal courts are applying it.' 5 Hence it seems proper to say that
the nonconfiscatory rate schedule must yield a return sufficient to
enable the utility to compete successfully with other businesses in the
struggle for the investor's dollar.
12

Supra note ii, at 692, 43 Sup.Ct. at 679. Cf. the statement in Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 48, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 198 (19o9): "There is
no particular rate of compensation which must in all cases and in all parts of the
country be regarded as sufficient for capital invested in business enterprises.
Such compensation must depend greatly upon circumstances and locality; among
other things, the amount of risk in the business is a most important factor, as
well as the locality where the business is conducted, and the rate expected and
usually realized there upon investments of a somewhat similar nature with regard
to the risk attending them."
'1 Cf. Kimhman, The Principleof Competitive Cost in Public,Utility Regulation
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 805, 818 et seg.
14McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).
'sSouthwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Ft. Smith, 294 Fed. io2 (W. D. Ark.
1923), aff'gd 270 U. S.627, 46 Sup. Ct. 2o6 (1926); Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Com., 3oo Fed. Igo (D. Ind. 1924); Citizens Gas Co. v. Public Service
Com., 8 F. (2d) 632 (W. D. Mo. 1925); Springfield G. & E. Co. v. Public Service
Com., ioF. (2d) 252 (W. D. Mo. 1925); Pacific T. & T. Co. v. Whitcomb, 12 F.
(2d) 279 (W. D. Wash. 1926); Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson, 19 F. (2d) 547
(D. Idaho, 1927).
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As A MATTER OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, MAY A "JUST AND
REASONABLE"

RATE EXCEED ONE THAT IS BARELY
NONCONFISCATORY?

The use of the terms under consideration goes back to the earliest
acts vesting rate-controlling power in commissions.. These early
acts, dealing with the power to regulate railroad rates, were framed
with a view to give tangible form, through orders of administrative
tribunals, to the common law principle that common carriers should
serve at reasonable rates. 7 The doctrine of confiscation had not
yet arisen. Its first suggestion by the Supreme Court seems to be
in i886.18 The earlier decisions had indicated no constitutional
limits to the rate-regulating power."9 Hence the original meaning of
the words, "just and reasonable," could have had no reference to
rates barely clearing a minimum beyond which the state could not go.
Indubitably they signified rates that were "fair" in the sense of a
public policy that sought to protect the well-being of both utilities
and patrons. This involves the use of discretion, of judgment as to
the ends to be promoted by utility rates and as to the effect of
particular schedules in promoting the desired ends. It calls for taking
account of special circumstances affecting the "justness" of the rates
for a particular utility. It seems clear that there may be conditions
which will make the "fair" rate substantially in excess of the nonconfiscatory one.20 And the mere fact of the development of the
doctrine of confiscation could hardly give to the terms, "just and
reasonable," a narrower significance than that which they had
before its rise.
' 6 Cf. "The limitation of rates to what are reasonable is the enactment in
statutory form of an ancient rule of the common law." Turner v. Connecticut
Co., 9i Conn. 692, 697, IOI Atl. 88, 90

(1917).

2TSee California Act of Apr. 22, 1858, § 4, cited and set forth in Spring Valley
Water Works v. Schottler, 11O U. S. 347, 349, 4 Sup. Ct. 48 (I884)--"reasonable
rates"; Fla. Act of 1887, § 5, set out in McWhorter v. Pensacola & A. R. R., 24
Fla. 417, 465, 5 So. 129, 133 (i888)-"reasonable and just rates"; Ga. Act of
Oct. 14, 1879, § 6, set forth in Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. R., 5 Fed. 641, 643

(C. C. Ga. 188i)-"a schedule of just and reasonable rates of charges"; Tenn.
Act of March 30, 1883, § 13, set forthin Louisville & N. R. R. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 679, 684 (C. C. Tenn. 1884)--"just and reasonable compensation."
lsRailroad Commission Cases, II6 U. S. 307, 331, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 345 (1886).
19 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94
U. S. 164 (1876); Peik v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1876); Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. R. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179 (1876); Winona & St. P. R. R. v. Blake,
94 U. S. i8o (1876); Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. i8I (1876); Ruggles v. Illinois,
io820 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. 832 (1883).
For a discussion of this point see p. 46o, infra.
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Curiously enough, while the conclusion reached above seems to
have been accepted almost without dissent by judges2' and by at
least some writers, 22 cases which squarely support it are comparatively
few. Practically all the judicial pronouncements thereof prove upon
examination to be pure dicta.? There are a few, however, which
may properly be cited as upholding it.
Chief among these are the cases involving the extent of the review
of rate-fixing orders by the state courts. Where the statute prescribes that the rate fixed shall be just and reasonable a number of
decisions hold that judicial review is not to be limited to the question
of confiscation, but is to consider whether the rates meet the statutory
description.24 This necessarily implies that a just and reasonable
rate may be higher than one that is barely nonconfiscatory.
Further support is given this view by cases from several jurisdictions refusing to consider on appeal contentions by patrons that rates
set by the commission are too high.25 These cases are not satisfactorily explained on the ground of judicial respect for the decisions
of public utility commissions in the commissions' specialized field.
It is doubtless true that the consumers, having no recognized property
interest in the receipt of light, heat, or transportation service, do not
qualify as candidates for the exercise of the court's "own independent
judgment as to both law and facts" within the constitutional rule laid
down in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough.2 Hence i
distinction might very well be drawn between the extent of review
available in respect to questions of fact in an appeal by a utility
raising the constitutional issue of confiscation and in an appeal by a
27
But it
patron raising the question of reasonableness and justness.
is well settled that judicial abdication stops short of permitting the
21
The cases cited infra notes 37, 38,41-45 contain judicialpronouncements to
this effect.
222 WHITTEN, op. cit. supra note I, at I88O, 1889-i9oo.
2
3See discussion infra pp. 455-456.
24
Union Pac. R. R. v. Public Utilities Com., 95 Kan. 6o4, 148 Pac. 667 (1915);
Railroad Com. v. Houston & T. C. R. R., 9o Tex. 340, 38 S. W. 750 (1897);
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. Railroad Com., 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W.

9o5
262,
2

(29o8). See Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. State,
266 (19o9).

23

Okla.

510, 522, 1Ol

Pac.

5Steamboat Canal Co. v. Garson, 43 Nev. 298, 185 Pac. 8Ol (1919); City of
Scranton v. Public Service Com. 8o Pa. Super. Ct. 549 (1923); Lewiston Borough
v. Public Service Com., 8o Pa. Super. Ct. 528 (1923); Salt Lake City v. Utah
L. & T. Co., 52 Utah, 210, 173 Pac. 556 (1918).
26253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920).
27
See City of Scranton v. Public Service Com., supra note 25, at 557.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
commissions to proceed upon erroneous views of their power under
the law,2 8 and that the administrative tribunals will not be permitted
to exercise powers beyond those vested in them by constitution or
by statute.29 If the just and reasonable rate prescribed by statute
may not substantially exceed a nonconfiscatory rate, it seems clear
that an order permitting a rate excessive in that particular would be
ultra vires. Hence a refusal to review administrative action in that
respect necessarily implies that the just and reasonable rate may
legally exceed the nonconfiscatory one.
In Ohio it has been held 30 that under a statute giving the public
utilities commission power to set asiderates set by municipal authority
and found to be unjust and unreasonable, the commission is not
required to uphold the challenged rates merely because they are
nonconfiscatory. Possibly in accord is a New Jersey case31 wherein
the court says that it holds, under a statute requiring the commission
to fix "just and reasonable individual rates," that a refusal to permit
an advance is not justified by a finding that existing rates are not
shown to be confiscatory, since a finding that they are not confiscatory is not equivalent to a finding that they are just and reasonable.3 2
An examination of the case, however, shows clearly that upon the
facts developed the existing rates were actually confiscatory. Its
standing as an authority upon the question under examination therefore seems very doubtful.
But one dictum has been found in opposition to the conclusion
here set forth. In City of Eau Claire v. Railroad Commission33 the
Wisconsin court said, "We believe. . . that the legislative command
to the commission to ascertain the reasonable rate contemplates
such a rate as would be held not confiscatory upon the complaint of
28

See Curtis, Judicial Review of Commission Rate Regulation-The Ohio Valley
Case (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV.862, 871; Brown, The Functionsof Courts and Commissions in Public Utility Rate Regulation (1924) 38 HAav. L. REV.I4I, 156-157;

Wiel, Administrative Finality (1925) 38 HA-Rv. L. REV. 447, 457-458.
29City of Lima v. Public Utilities Com., ioo Ohio St. 416, 126 N. E. 318 (1919)
furnishes an example.
s0City of Portsmouth v. Public Utilities Com., lO8 Ohio St.

272,

14o N. E. 6o4

(1923).

31Cohlingswood Sewerage Co. v. Borough of Collingswood, 91 N. J. L. 20, 102
AtI.
9oi (Sup. Ct. 1918).
32
"The sewerage company was entitled to a formal determination of the claim
advanced by it that existing rates are unjust and unreasonable.... This right
was not niet by an adjudication that the rates were not so low as to be confiscatory." Collingswood Sewerage Co. v. Borough of Collingswood, supra note
31, at 22, 102

Atl. at

33,78 Wis. 207,

9O1.

189 N. W. 476

(1922).
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the utility, and that the public has a right to complain of any rate
which yields to the utility more than a reasonable return."m But
as this is in conflict with a prior Wisconsin decision as to the extent
of judicial review 5 and with a recent Wisconsin dictum,36 it is questionable whether it can be regarded as possessing even the weight
usually accorded to considered dictum.
In view of the clear preponderance of such authority as exists
upon the proposition it seems that the question whether a just and
reasonable rate may exceed a barely nonconfiscatory one must be
answered affirmatively.
MUST A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEED

A NONCONFISCATORY ONE?

The inquiry to which this question is directed may also be stated
thus: Do the statutes impose upon the commissions a duty to set a
rate schedule yielding a return substantially higher than that which
will clear the confiscation bar? To adopt another phrasing: Is a
just and reasonable rate substantially higher than a nonconfiscatory
one as a matter of law? A diagram may make the issue clearer.
Let A represent the rate the
B
return from which is barely nonconfiscatory, that is, just high
C-----------------enough to induce the continued
flow of capital to the utility as
A
needed. No rate which equals or exceeds this will violate the rule
against confiscation. There is a point, however, beyond which it is
impracticable to raise rates, namely, the point at which the charge
for the service rendered exceeds its value to so many consumers
that the reduction in the number of patrons due to higher rates
more than offsets the increase in revenue that should be afforded
by higher unit charges. Let B represent this limit. The space
between A and B remains debatable ground. No rate within those
limits will be confiscatory; no rate within those limits will be unprofitable. The nearer that C (representing the established or "just
and reasonable" rate) approaches B, the greater will be the utility's
return. The nearer it approaches A, the happier will be the patrons.
Our question is whether a statute specifying that rates shall be
3
"Supra note
35

33, at 216, 189 N. W. at 480.
Minneapolis, St. P. & Q. S. M. Ry. v. Railroad Com., supra note 24.
36See Waukesha G. & E. Co. v. Railroad Com., 181 Wis. 281, 288, 291, 194

N. W. 846, 849, 850 (1923).
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just and reasonable commands the rate-fixing bodyto locate Cat a
point substantially above A. Some recent writers appear to contend
for an affirmative answer, at least in the absence of unusual conditions.17 The statutes themselves commonly do not set up any specifications of the characteristics of a just and reasonable rate, so that,
if the affirmative answer is to be given, it must be established
as the result of judicial interpretation of the statutes rather than
from any express language of the statutes themselves.
The cases do not seem to support the position of those who contend
for an affirmative answer. Dicta which may be interpreted as upholding that view are comparatively frequent. Thus we encounter
such statements as the following:
"It [a just and reasonable rate] is a rate which yields to the
carrier a fair return upon the value of the property employed
in the public service, and it is a rate which is fair to the shipper
for the service rendered: and when this rate is established, if it
results in large profits to the carrier, the carrier is fortunate in
its business, and if it results in a loss of earning power so that
the business of the carrier is unprofitable the carrier is unfortunate. But the rate may not be lowered or raised merely
upon the ground that the carrier is either maldng or losing
'
money, providing always the rate is a reasonable and just one." 38
"On the one hand a just and reasonablerate cannever exceed,
perhaps can rarely equal, the value of the service to the consumer. On the other hand it can never be made by compulsion
of public authority so low as to amount to confiscation. A just
and reasonable rate must ordinarily fall somewhere between
these two extremes, so as to allow both sides to profit by the
conduct of the business and the improvements of methods and
increase of efficiency.
"Justice to the consumer ordinarily would require a rate
somewhat less than the full value of the service to him: and
justice to the company would ordinarily require a rate above
the point at which it would become confiscatory."3 9
"The rate should be, in the language of the statute, 'just and
reasonable'; in other words, not so low as to approach the line
of confiscation nor so high as to be unjust and oppressive.
A
' 4
just and reasonable rate need not approach either line.
31See articles cited supranote 5. Perhaps the clearest statement of this position
is the following: "It [a just and reasonable rate] is a rate that justly and reasonably,
that is, fairly and equitablydivides this spread between the cost of furnishing the
service, including the cost of the capital involved, and the value of the service
to the customer." Guernsey, Principles Underlying Reasonable Rates, supra
note 5, at 7.
38See Hooker v. Interstate Commerce Com., 188 Fed. 242, 253 (Com. Ct. 1911).
39See Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 84 N. J. L.
463, 47x, 87 Atl. 651, 655 (Sup.Ct. 1913).
40

Waukesha G. & E. Co. v. Railroad Com., supra note 36.

JUST AND REASONABLE RATE
But decisions squarely holding that the just and reasonable rate
must exceed the nonconfiscatory rate do not appear in the reports.
An analysis of the cases cited in the articles referred to4 ' supports
the statement as to the dearth of authority for the contention that
the statutes require the just and reasonable rate to be fixed substantially above the level of freedom from confiscation. To be cited
as authority for such a contention it would seem that a case should
hold unlawful a commission order on the ground that it sought to
hold the rate down to the barely nonconfiscatory level. The nearest
approach to such a case is Collingswood Sewerage Co. v. Borough of
Collingswood.4 The authority of that case, as heretofore explained,
is shaken by the clearly confiscatory character of the rates involved,
and in any event it goes no farther than to hold that a finding that
rates are nonconfiscatory is not equivalent to a finding that they are
just and reasonable. It does not hold that normally such rates
should be above the nonconfiscatory point.
No other cases have been found even remotely approaching the
position under discussion. Several involve the extent of review by
appellate tribunals over rates established by regulatory bodies. 43 In
others, rates set by public authority were upheld against contentions
that they were confiscatory" or were unduly high.45 In some cases,
orders were overturned because confiscatory 4" or because based upon
erroneous theories as to valuation.47 One case involved the reasonableness of a charge as a matter of common law.48 The different
factors which enter in when the state has embarked upon a policy of
rate regulation obviously render it inapposite here. The points
involved in other cases cited have still less bearing upon the problem
under discussion. 49 It seems a fair statement therefore that there is
4
2Supra note 31.
See cases cited supra note 24.
"Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, supra note 39.
4Hooker v. Interstate Commerce Com., supra note 38; City of Detroit v.
Michigan Railroad Com., 209 Mich. 395, 177 N. W. 3o6 (1920); O'Brien v. Board
of Public Utility Con'rs, 92 N. J. L. 44 , 105 At1. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
46Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U. S. 413, 45 Sup. Ct. 534 (1925); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Board of Railroad Com'rs, 78 Fed. 236 (C. C. Calif. 1896); Morgan's
L. & T. R. R. & S. S. Co. v. Railroad Com., 127 La. 636, 53 So. 89o (1911);
Louisiana R. & N. Co. v. Railroad Com., 131 La. 387, 59 So. 820 (1912).
47
State P. U. Com. v. Springfield G. & E. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891
(1920); Havre de Grace & Perryville Br. Co. v. Towers, 132 Md. 16, 103 Atl.
319 (I918).
48
Canada Southern Ry. v. International Bridge Co., 8 App. Cas. 723 (1881).
49
Parkersburg & Ohio River Trans Co. v. City of Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691,
2 Sup. Ct. 732 (I883)-whether charge for use of municipal wharf was invalid

"Supnr
note 5.
43
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no substantial authority for the contention that a just and reasonable
rate must, as a matter of law, substantially exceed the nonconfiscatory
rate in the normal case.
SHOULD THE JUST AND REASONABLE RATE SUBSTANTIALLY
EXCEED A NONCONFISCATORY ONE?

Here we enter the field of policy, of discretion. Primarily, at least,
the decision rests with the repositories of state and national policy,
the several legislatures. Since they have passed it on to the regulatory
agencies with no more specific direction than that rates shall be just
and reasonable, broad power of interpreting these terms rests with
the commissions. Only in the event of confiscation on the one hand
or possibly of gross abuse at the upper limit on the other50 would
judicial interference be justified. It is from the standpoint of policy
then that the proposal that just and reasonable rates should exceed
the nonconfiscatory point must be judged.
Much depends upon one's conception of the end to be attained,
and views of the ideal social order may vary. But it seems a fair
enough statement that the American democratic tradition has for its
ideal a social order in which, on the economic side, there may be the
widest possible enjoyment of a relatively high living standard. To
as a tonnage duty; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10
Sup. Ct. 462 (189o)-necessity of judicial review of reasonableness of commission
orders as part of due process; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., ,8i
U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct. 861 (19oI)-applicability of common law doctrines of public
service to those engaged in interstate commerce; Cotting v. Kansas City S. Y.
Co., 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. 30 (19oi)-violation of equal protection clause
in statute arbitrarily singling out a particular enterprise for regulation; Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Elec. Co., 248 Fed. 439 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918)-common
law liability for discriminatory charges; Detroit & M. R. R. v. Michigan R. R.
COM., 2o3 Fed. 864 (E. D. Mich. 1913)-whether review of commission by
Michigan Supreme Court is judicial or legislative.
50"Unless a rate established by the commission is clearly oppressive on the one
hand or confiscatory on the other, no judicial question is presented." Salt Lake
City v. Utah L. & T. Co., supra note 25, at 227, 173 Pac. at 563. "Having
regard to the statute solely, it is apparent that the determination of the Commission cannot be disturbed unless it shall be made to appear to the court by
clear and satisfactory evidence that the rate established by it is either unreasonably low or unreasonably high." Waukesha G. & E. Co. v. Railroad Com.,
supra note 36, at 290, 194 N. W. at 850. "The order of the commission in the
premises is final unless (i) beyond the power which it could constitutionally
exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law;
or (4) the result of the commission's having arbitrarily fixed the rates contrary
to evidence, or without evidence to support it, or in a grossly unreasonable
manner." Borough of Lansdowne v. Public Service CoM., 74 Pa. Super. Ct.
203, 209 (1920).
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secure this there must be maximum productivity at minimum cost.
As Mr. Justice Holmes has said in another connection, there is an
eternal conflict "between the effort of every man to get the most he
can for his services, and that of society ...to get his services for the
least possible return."'" Society must permit the individual to take
such returns from the common storehouse as will stir him to maximum
productivity. To permit him to take more reduces unduly the
amount available for general distribution. Our devotion to private
enterprise on the competitive basis is bottomed upon the premise that
in the long run it accomplishes this purpose of maximum production
and distribution at minimum cost."a In the fields where competition has broken down as a regulative force, compulsory social
control, wielded by our various regulatory bodies, enters in, but the
ultimate objective remains the same.
The argument for a just and reasonable rate in excess of a nonconfiscatory rate seems to run counter to this view. As pointed
out,12 it calls for a division between utility and patron of the spread

between the nonconfiscatory rate and the highest rate which can
profitably be charged, upon terms vaguely described as fair and
equitable. 3 In defense of this it is apparently urged that "economic
law" demands it, that in fact neither utilities nor public bodies
can successfully set rates that will depart from this fair and equitable
division. This assertion is based upon two assumptions: (i) if rates
are too low and the return is reduced below that available in other
enterprises of ecual security, capital will not be available for public
utility enterprises, and it will become necessary to raise the rates;
(2) if the rates are set too high, the extremely favorable earnings in
the public utility field will cause a rush of capital thereto, and competition will force rates down.54 Both assumptions seem false. As
to the first, the necessity of an adequate return to attract needed
capital is recognized, but the rate schedule must yield this return to
avoid the stigma of confiscation. 55 It is not necessary to place the
rate above the nonconfiscatory mark to attract capital. As to the
51
Rolmes, J. dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, io8, 44 N. E.
1077, 1081 (1896).
SlaCf. Brown, Economic Basis and Limits of Public Utility Regulation (1928)

53 Ame. B. A. R. 717, 720.
52Supra page 453.
5See supra note 37.
54
See Guernsey, Principles Underlying Reasonable Rates, supra note 5, at 9;
Guernsey, State CommissionLaws Regulate Rates, Not Profits,supranote 5, at 267;
Guernsey, The Test of Reasonable Rates, supra note 5, at 17.
nBluefield W. W. & I. Co. v. Public Service Com., supra note I.
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second, it ignores the fact that competition in the utility field is
practically extinct. To a large and ever-widening extent, the various
utilities have a legal monopoly of their respective fields through
certificates of public necessity and convenience or through similar
devices, and where this is not true the naturally monopolistic nature
of the business is an effective guard against 'competition save in
sporadic instances. Thus entrenched, the utilities are in position to
place an embargo upon unwanted capital. Investors may be ever so
anxious to place their money in the profitable field, but, if the existing
utility does not wish to accept it, they are effectually barred. Competition as an effective upper limit to rates in the utility field does
not exist.
The demand for a rate substantially above the nonconfiscatory
point thus becomes a claim that the utilities shall receive a return
substantially in excess of that necessary to induce continued investment in the business, unchecked by the fear of a reduction by the
influx of competing capital. It is a claim for a reasonable return in
double measure. Economically this seems unsound. It imposes
upon the other productive enterprises of society or upon the ultimate
consumer, as the case may be, an unnecessary cost burden. In so
far as it does this it defeats the American ideal of the widest diffusion
of general economic well-being.
Another defense of the plea for greater than nonconfiscatory rates
appears to be based upon the premise that the economic basis of
regulation is the prevention of monopoly charges, and therefore that
interference with the utility's rate schedule can be justified only upon
a showing that the schedule constitutes a "monopolistic abuse." 6 If
the rates are no more than would be chargeable under competitive
conditions, it is urged, they should be left undisturbed. 7 It is submitted that the premise is erroneous. State regulation is not an
attempt to reproduce the results of competition in a monopolistic
field. It is true that monopolistic conditions do away with competition as a regulative force and so create a need for governmental regulation in its place; but it is equally true that whenever competition,
though present, fails to regulate efficiently, state control again has a
legitimate field for operation. We have no interest in either competition or monopoly in the abstract. What we are concerned with is
maximum production and distribution at minimum cost. A system
of regulation based upon a theory of reproducing competitive price
conditions cannot do this. In the first place, it is utterly impracticable. What competitive conditions would bring about in an
NSee Updegraff, op. cit. supra note 5,at 252.

57!hd. at 257.
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actually monopolistic field is a matter of pure speculation. The
answer received will vary according to the type of competition that
is assumed. Even then there must remain a doubt whether the
actual result would coincide with the estimate. If rate regulation is
to be conditioned upon a demonstration that the charges claimed by
the utility exceed those realizable under competitive conditions, it
will be well-nigh impossible to comply with the condition precedent.
In the second place, the proposed test would in many instances
deprive the public of the advantages springing from monopoly
organization. The lowest possible rates under a regime of competing
utilities, safeguarded by the constitutional rule against confiscation,
may be so high as to leave a wide field within which charges yielding
retirns to a monopolistic enterprise entirely out of proportion to that
necessary to induce investment might be sustained.
It is submitted therefore that the sound policy is to confine utility
rates to the point yielding a return sufficient to induce continued
investment as needed, that any higher return represents an economically unjustifiable burden upon the customers. For this view
there is sanction in the utterances of judges, 5 even in the very
opinions cited in favor of a more liberal allowance to the utilities. 9
But such a rate schedule is also that which is prescribed as a minimum
by the rule against confiscation. It follows that in the normal situation the just and reasonable rate should not substantially exceed the
nonconfiscatory one.60
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"The rate may be made high enough to cover the cost of service, the carrying
charges, a reasonable sum for depreciation, and a fair return upon the investment.
Less than this will not give the railway a reasonable rate. The action of a utilities
commission which reduces a rate below this point unduly deprives the owners of
their property without just compensation. If a rate exceeds this point to an
appreciable degree and the commission, upon proper application, declines to
reduce it, the court would, in the absence of other controlling facts, reduce it to
a reasonable point." Turner v. Connecticut Co., 91 Conn. 692, 699, IOI Atl. 88,
91 (1917).
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"The real test of the justice and reasonableness of an individual rate seems
to be that it should be as low as possible and yet sufficient to induce the investment of capital in the business, and its continuance therein." Public Service
Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, supra note 39, at 474, 87 Atl. at 656.
To the same effect is the language employed in O'Brien v. Board of Public Utility
Com'rs, supra note 45, at 49, IO5 Atl. at 134. "The real test of the justice and
reasonableness of any rate seems to be that it should be as low as possible and
yet sufficient to induce the investment of capital in the business and its continuance therein." State P. U. Com. v. Springfield G. & E. Co., supra note 47,
at 219, 125 N. E. at 896.
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'See further upon this point Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factorin Rate
Making (I919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 516, 534 et seg. The whole matter is so well
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Of course, as the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has said
recently, the utility should not be held "down to the last dollar."'"
Rates are fixed for the future and prophecy is an essential part of
the process. In making the forecast of probable return, sufficient
leeway should be allowed to take care of any reasonably probable
change in circumstances that may affect adversely the company's
earning power, as well as of such increases in the rate base as may
occur through additions and improvements not counterbalanced by
added earnings. But such an allowance, properly made, does not
award a return in excess of that which is nonconfiscatory. It is
merely a means of assuring that the return will not fall below the
confiscation point.
It is not intended to deny that there may be cases in which a
substantially larger return may be justified by sound policy. In
that event, as has been suggested in the prior discussion, a proper
interpretation of the statutory direction to fix just and reasonable
rates renders it in the power of the regulatory bodies to permit such
a return. The instances calling for the exercise of this power are of
course not susceptible of detailed enumeration, but the point may be
illustrated by naming a few in which it seems that a return in excess
of the nonconfiscatory rate might properly be allowed. Thus if a
utility has suffered severe loss through embezzlement or mismanagement of an officer, placing it in a precarious financial position, it
might be sound policy to permit recoupment by a temporarily high
rate of earnings though there would be no legal or constitutional
obligation to do so. Likewise provision might be made for the
encouragement of experiments looking to improvement of service or
to the development of new machinery. And an inducement to increasing efficiency of operation to a point in excess of the standards of the
time and place in the particular utility might be set up by permitting
the retention of part of the gain by the utility in the form of a return
somewhat in advance of the nonconfiscatory return. 2 In this manner
a higher return to efficiently managed utilities might be combined
with a reduction of rates to their patrons. The significant thing,
however, is that these special earnings should be permitted only as a
matter of grace to accomplish special ends. Ordinarily the just and
reasonable rate should not exceed the nonconfiscatory level.
discussed by Professor Edgerton that further treatment would have seemed unnecessary but for the added arguments adduced in the articles cited supra note 5.
61See MacThwaite 0. & G. Co. v City of Ada, 20 Okla. Corp. Com. Rep. 570,
575, P. U. R. 1927D, 833, 843 (1927).
62
See suggestion to this effect in Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public
Utility Com'rs supra note 39, at 473, 87 Atl. at 656.

